Navy Times Article - Katrina, Disaster Response Policy

[dlgood]

I generally do not post news articles, but in this case I make an exception, because it's not generally available...

Federal troops should be first responders to natural disasters, experts say
September 14, 2005
John Yaukey
Navy Times

Hurricane Katrina invaded the Gulf Coast region like an enemy, cutting communications, isolating security forces and severing supply lines.

It's no surprise then that disaster coordinators, Pentagon officials and military experts are war-gaming future domestic catastrophes with the full-time military playing an integral first-responder role - possibly as a police force - which is now illegal.

"I think that's one of the interesting issues that Congress needs to take a look at," President Bush said while making his third tour of the battered Gulf Coast region this week.

Some homeland security experts now believe there should be federal troops - that don't need 72 hours for call-up as some National Guard units require - capable of dropping into a disaster zone as the damage is being done, rather than afterward.

"More of our military capability should be on alert in this kind of situation to move within hours instead of days," said Michael O'Hanlon, who studies both homeland security and military issues at the Washington, D.C.-based Brookings Institution."This includes both people and equipment like low-draft boats capable of cutting through shallow water."

This new thinking about a federal military presence in natural disasters was made abundantly clear last Friday when Coast Guard Vice Adm. Thad Allen replaced civilian Michael Brown, the embattled former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as the head of all federal Katrina recovery efforts.

But this debate is not without considerable historical baggage. The reluctance to use federal troops on U.S. soil is rooted in the perennial American struggle between states' rights and federal authority.

Here are some questions and answers that explore a sensitive policy issue that could change the way Americans save lives when disaster strikes.

Question: How much faster can full-time troops respond to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina than the National Guard?

Answer: A good example is the Army's elite 82nd Airborne Division. This unit, headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C., is capable of dropping troops into action anywhere in the world in less than 20 hours.

It can take National Guard units several days to respond in strength to hurricanes.

The 82nd Airborne is now helping with humanitarian aid in the Gulf Coast region, steering clear of any police activity.

There are about 20,000 active duty troops in the Gulf Coast region now, serving alongside 50,000 National Guard forces.

Q: As New Orleans flooded and slipped into anarchy, Katrina victims were pleading for more security. Why couldn't federal troops come to their rescue?

A: Federal troops are legally constrained in what they can do domestically by the Posse Comitatus Act. Passed in 1878 to limit the use of federal troops to control Southern polling places, Posse Comitatus makes it a crime to employ"any part of the Army ...to execute the laws." It does not apply to the Coast Guard.

Q: Can the restrictions against using federal troops for domestic enforcement be suspended in time of emergency?

A: Two laws allow this.

The president can invoke the Insurrection Act dating back to 1795, which permits the military use of federal troops on U.S. soil to put down violence that local authorities are incapable of handling.

Under the National Defense Act of 1916, the president can federalize a state's National Guard troops in an effort to centralize control over a chaotic situation. Bush suggested"federalizing" Louisiana's Guard forces when the chaos in New Orleans began escalating, but Gov. Kathleen Blanco objected.

Q: Have these measures been used before?

A: Yes. The elder President George H.W. Bush federalized the National Guard in California to quell the 1992 riots in Los Angeles.

In 1963, President Kennedy used the Alabama's Guard to force desegregation at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa.

In 1957, President Eisenhower used federal troops and the Arkansas National Guard to force the desegregation of Little Rock's public schools.

Q: Why change the laws restricting federal troops if there are fairly direct ways of circumventing them when the need arises?

A: Invoking rarely used measures can be difficult, time-consuming and potentially controversial.

In the case of Louisiana, a Republican president would be taking control from a Democratic governor. The Bush administration debated this and decided against it, according to reports about the dialogue between Washington and Baton Rouge.

Automatic mechanisms that permit, or even obligate, a powerful federal military response to a major disaster could save time by eliminating politics and indecision.

Comments

[scrollgirl.livejournal.com]

Some homeland security experts now believe there should be federal troops - that don't need 72 hours for call-up as some National Guard units require - capable of dropping into a disaster zone as the damage is being done, rather than afterward.

I don't know anything about the U.S. military, but could things have been different if Bush or whoever had started mobilising the National Guard units as soon as we knew Katrina was coming? True, troops that can respond in 20 hours versus 72 hours is always a good thing, but in instances when we do have forewarning, should federal troops be used when the National Guard could be prepared instead?

Also, what's your opinion on Bush suggesting the National Defense Act and Blanco turning him down? I get the impression from various blogs that the offer came too little, too late. If it had come earlier perhaps he wouldn't have been turned down? Just curious.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

True, troops that can respond in 20 hours versus 72 hours is always a good thing, but in instances when we do have forewarning, should federal troops be used when the National Guard could be prepared instead?

I'm not sure. Given the scope of the damages, and the superior resources of the Federal Government, I'm inclined to support use of Federal Troops. As currently stands, the Guard isn't really equipped enough to do what needs to be done. There were guard units that couldn't get into the city because they didn't have enough vehicles and so on... I think it's a case-by-case thing. In this particular case, the National Guard, even if it wasn't spread thin by the Iraq War, wouldn't have had enough resources. In other cases, it might have.

what's your opinion on Bush suggesting the National Defense Act and Blanco turning him down? I get the impression from various blogs that the offer came too little, too late.

Ultimately, top authority resides with the President and he can intervene with or without the Governor's say so. I think the real problem is that the President didn't stay informed. He knew, in advance, that Katrina was a Category 5, and that it would have devastating landfall. But from when it hit, and for about two days afterward - he had no real concept of the scope of the devastation. Which is why the Federal Government was first doing things on Saturday that it should have been doing on Tuesday or Wednesday at the latest.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

I don't know anything about the U.S. military, but could things have been different if Bush or whoever had started mobilising the National Guard units as soon as we knew Katrina was coming?

On this - yes. National Guard units in Wisconsin and Illinois were mobilizing before the hurricane hit... but they didn't get the coordination from the Federal Government they would have needed to get down to NOLA early on.

[mamculuna.livejournal.com]

Also New Mexico--they were ready before the hurricane came, but somehow the request that Gov. Blanco sent was not sufficient. I think there could be some kind of fail-safe for incapacitated governors, but mostly the system needs to be clear, simple, and practiced!

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

I think there could be some kind of fail-safe for incapacitated governors, but mostly the system needs to be clear, simple, and practiced!

There is a fail safe... the Presidency is the agency of last resort. As in the oft-cited example of Eisonhower sending in the airborne when Orval Faubus' refused to mobilize the guard. In the absence of performance on local levels, the State can and should act.

Reports seemed to indicate that NOLA hadn't done a great job with evacuations for Hurricane Ivan in 2004 but the feds dropped the ball on making sure everybody had their act together for 2005.

I would have expected more, because 9/11 really raised these sorts of responsiveness issues.

[mamculuna.livejournal.com]

Oh, yes, indeed. But one of the hold-ups was Blanco's reluctance to hand over the state to the Feds, which was the apparent price of getting the guard in. Though I think she's a corrupt mess, still I can somewhat understand the problems of surrendering state power.

I need to thiink about this a little more. I think this was pretty different from the Civil Rights situations.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

It's different. But personally - the override statutes are pretty clearly designed for circumstances when the State cannot or will not fulfill it's duties - and this seemed to qualify.

Beyond which - maybe it's just me - but I don't really see how the Administration's application of Posse Comitatus made a ton of sense.

The primary purpose behind the act was rooted in the politicization of Union Army officials during reconstruction. It'd be one thing if the NOLA was to be turned into a Military District for six years and looked on as subjugated territory. But that wasn't the scenario.

[mamculuna.livejournal.com]

Oddly, I almost always argue for federal intervention in many ways as a positive thing--usually the locals are less willing to help those who need it and have more corrupt ties. In the case of the reconstruction of NOLA, I think the feds are thones to do--there's so much corruption in LA that I wouldn't trust them to use money wisely, to tell the truth. But military occupation is another thing--although certainly in this case it would have been positive, opening the door in one case in a benign way can leave it open for things that aren't so good.

Having once, during Berkeley protests in the 1960's, had the National Guard parked in my street expressly to keep us in control, I am leery of getting them in. In that case, of course, the governor (Reagan) and the President (Nixon)were working together, but just experiencing it made me understand why people are afraid of giving the feds too much military power over citizens.

What I was thinking about for natural disasters and terrorist attacks would be something different.Maybe a committee of other governors who could act for an incapacitated governor for a limited period of time. Actually, two things that could help in this kind of situation would be:

1. Streamline and simplify the way that the governor calls for help from other states, bypassing the feds but getting something direct from other states

2. Creating a special exception to the Posse Comitatus that would limit the President's powers and set limits, that could be overrridden by the governor when incapacitation ends.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

I can see where you are coming from. There has to be something there that clearly delineates the difference between calling in the Military to quell legitimate dissent, and calling in the military because a city really has gone down the crapper. A la NOLA.

I know the worries over occupation, but one of the undeniable outcomes of Posse Comitatus was that localities were free to institue Jim Crow laws. And the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration's willingness to set it aside was pretty crucial.

Streamlining the process by which governors call upon one another would be great. I'm just somewhat disappointed, because I always felt that managing interstate affairs would have fit the federal role.

I guess not - someone is going to have to write some trigger-able provisions whereby that can happen. (I.E. in cases like licensing set asides so out of state doctors can legally practice during emergencies)

[maquisleader.livejournal.com]

I think this is a good idea, especially after hearing so many of the National Guard saying how frustrated they were over waiting for the call from the Gov's office. And waiting. And waiting.

FEMA is a joke and has been for some time. When the tornado ripped through here a few years ago, we found out they only give money to people who own property and who didn't have insurance.

So those of us who got screwed over by their insurance company, and the people who rented -- we got zip from FEMA.

Having the ability to order in the military would also take the burden off a civilian police force that's simply not trained or equipped to handle situations like Katrina.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

Having the ability to order in the military would also take the burden off a civilian police force that's simply not trained or equipped to handle situations like Katrina.

I think the big thing this would do, is give an administration the legal/political cover they need to take unpopular action. Although, in the case of Katrina - I think the press and country would have rallied around the administration for taking decisive action. Just as happened immediately after 9/11.

FEMA is a joke and has been for some time. When the tornado ripped through here a few years ago, we found out they only give money to people who own property and who didn't have insurance.

Which Hurricane was this? FEMA was a boondoggle in the 80s, but it generally had a pretty good rep in the late 90s.

[mamculuna.livejournal.com]

Yes, you're quite right that the feds should have intervened to stop Jim Crow, though I'm not sure the will was there--racism was fairly rampant throughout the country in those earliest days. And I absolute think federal intervention was necessary for civil rights changes to end it. No question.

Let's hope whatever happens is sensible and workable.

[dlgood.livejournal.com]

This is very true. Preventing Jim Crow would have required a full scale occupation of the South for years. And by the late 1870s, there certainly was no political will to do that.