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Monday, June 14th, 2004 06:16 pm
The Icon: It's the DD(X), the US Navy's 21st-Century Destroyer. As some folks may or may not know, I've been working in the Defense field for some time. My group at work is in the process of firming up the product line brochure and communications plan for Navy PEO Ships. I happen to really like that photo (the bigger one is beautiful) so it's my current icon of choice. (My father also happens to be a senior systems engineer on the DD(X) program for another firm.)

Cleveland Indians outfielder, Coco Crisp, may have the coolest name in sports.

NBA Finals: For anyone on this list that actually follows pro-ball, I must admit I'm pretty shocked at just how much of an ass-whipping the Pistons are laying on the Lakers. Almost as shocking as Tom Tolbert and his hideous 1970's style plaid suits - so ugly even Herb Tarleck wouldn't wear them.

Last Friday: My thanks for those who offered empathy for my complaints. As it turned out, I'm a big whiny crybaby, with nothing much to moan about. The office was empty, I got tons of work done, and there was zero traffic on the roads after all.

Ralph Wiley died last night of a heart attack at the age of 52. For those who don't follow sports, you probably won't know or care. Wiley wrote 28 cover articles for Sports Illustrated, had a column on ESPN.Com Page 2, and was the author of several books including Why Black People Tend to Shout. Wiley was funny, sharp, and witty - one of the rare sports commentators who could speak in vernacular without being lame, who could offer social commentary without seeming like a pompous blowhard, and who had genuine insight. I'll miss reading him.
Saturday, June 19th, 2004 20:18 (UTC)
I think the fleet size is excessive. I don't think we have any particular need for the posed 375-ship Navy. I don't think we need the size submarine fleet the Pentagon requested.

But, the United States does have the potential to serve as "World Policeman" - and presumably under more judicious leadership, as a force to bolster peace, stability, and freedom throughout the world. It serves our interests to do so. Presuming they respect the capability of American leadership, it serves the interest of much of the world as well.

I happen to believe the US could accomplish much with a greater emphasis on diplomacy, foreign aid, and cultural exhanges than we currently have. An emphasis that would be far more cost-effective in both quantitative and qualitative ways.

But it also requires a military force.

The particulars of that force, are not really very well reflected in our current fleet. The Arleigh Burkes are still in production, but they were designed primarily for blue water operation, and for cold war scenarios we don't face anymore. The Navy has a DDG modernization plan, and the Flight IIA ships are more reflective of current requirements than DDG-51, but it's expensive. That's why the Spruances are getting mothballed - the weren't worth the operating costs.

The future of the navy, if it responds to the threats we expect to face - lies in shallow water operations. The newer surface combatant programs, LCS and DD(X) are oriented around such concepts.

As for cost, I fully expect the ships to cost more than we probably should spend on them. The sad fact is that ship programs are expensive, and they take years. We're not going to see the first DD(X) in the water until at least 2011. But if it's the ship we actually need, then we're stuck spending on it now.

Vern Clark's solution, to this point, has been to save money with the newer class of ships through lowered operating costs. Ships that are reconfigurable, are better networked for joint interoperability, on open architecture systems than can be far more easily upgraded than the DD's were. And through "optimal manning" - which is code for reducing the number of sailors on the ships. The hope, is that the projected benefits from efficiency and from more suitable capability and technical development will justify the cost of the ship.

And, of course, the programs are also there to keep the Navy's dockyards and infrastructure busy when the Arleigh Burke's are complete. We don't just have to sell the new ships to congress. We have to convince the congress not to order more Arleigh Burkes.

Do I think we should spend as much on the military buildup as we do? I don't know. Some projects are mistakes, like SEAHORSE. Some, like the BPAUV's, I think offer a lot of value both militarily and commercially.

Were the budget up to me, I'd be paying more in taxes than I do. Tuition at public universities wouldn't be rising to the extent that it is. We would spend more resources on butter and less on guns. And in no small part, because I think we can accomplish far more of our foreign aims through persuasive means than coercive.

I don't happen to agree with the administration on many of their policies. I disagree with the administration on almost every means by which they wish to enact their policies - not only because I think they're morally suspect, but also because I don't think they'd be successful in accomplishing the aims they purport to seek.

As to the DD(X) - I'm not entirely certain. If we have aspirations of a forward presence in the world, than we will need a future class of ships to meet the needs we'll face, rather than ships designed for the cold war. As to whether it's worth the cost, I'm not sure myself.
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Sunday, June 20th, 2004 20:15 (UTC)
The Ticonderoga’s and Arleigh Burkes will not be old enough in my opinion to seriously consider replacing at that point

As a note, the Ticonderoga's replacement, the CG(X) won't see water until 2019 at the earliest (and likely later) - by which time the 38 year-old CG-47 would already be decomissioned.

They were designed for blue water operations because, quite frankly, that is the Navy’s job, projecting American power overseas. When it comes to responding to threats they see requiring shallow water operations, that isn’t their job. It’s mine, or more specifically the job of the Coast Guard.

But what about shallow water threats overseas? Do you expect the Coast Guard to go into the Persian Gulf? (Most of which is less than 180 feet deep)

The LCS and DD(X) are supposed to be directed more towards littoral warfare abroad, because our deep water dominance is so great that there is far less expectation that US ships will see battle in the open seas that the Ticonderogas and Arleigh Burkes were designed for. They are far more likely to be called upon to support the Army and Marines, operating in coastal regions. That's the power projection capacity they're tasked to meet.

The defense industry is bloated and sustaining itself for its own sake. If we truly want to meet the challenges and threats we now face, we need to be willing to significantly restructure our organizations and adjust spending priorities.

You'll get no argument on that from me. As I've said many times, much of the US needs can be met more cheaply through alliance anyway. And I certainly think a budgetary priorities should be shifted - starting with a revamp of the administration's silly tax policies. The Coast Guard and Border Patrol should be getting better funding than they do. I won't dispute that at all. But that doesn't mean I think we should put the kibosh on DD(X) altogether.
Sunday, June 20th, 2004 20:05 (UTC)
SDI was by and large part of Reagan’s overall strategy to spend the Soviet Union into the ground.

We like to say that now. That's not quite the truth. They funded SDI because they really believed in it, and because they really wanted it. Spending the Soviet Union into the ground was something of a discovery along the way. Long after we had any need to spend anyone into the ground, there is prominent backing for NMD. Back in '97, when I was writing on it, the Rumsfeld Commission was calling as loudly for NMD as they possibly could. Despite most threat studies, and scientific backing - if not for the priority shift caused by the WoT, it'd still be a top priority program.

Prior to WWII we didn’t have a massive defense industry. We mobilized civilian industry to create the things we needed.

On that score, one of the problematic issues is America's declining industrial base. The US has shifted further and further to an information-service based economy, and that fuels a lot of insecurity about the availability for a manufacturing base should one prove necessary. You could see that sentiment in the steel tariff debate. While the overall economic interest of the vast majority of the citizens of the country was best served by the decline in domestic steel production (and those steelworkers being transformed into other sectors) a lot of folks question whether America should have interdependence in that. It's a far greater worry if we take this to defense industries.

I think there's a certain degree of legitimacy to those concerns. The economy will run fine without a large military-industrial sector. But it might not be an economy with much of an industrial sector.

That’s why we have the UN. If we balance the load between all members and not act unilaterally when we don’t get our way, that body will function as it is supposed to.

There are areas the UN is very well suited to, but warfighting isn't one of them. I think the UN has performed well in Peacekeeping roles. But during active hostilities, I don't think it can work well. Certainly, the international system works better if the US operates hand-in-hand with a vast coalition of partners, rather than as a cowboy, but this isn't necessarily an area the UN will ever work well on.

I find it highly ironic and hypocritical that the Neo-Cons, and many others on the Right, who were so dead set against the idea of us taking on that role and engaging in nation building during the Clinton years, are now the ones leading the battle cry about how bringing democracy to Iraq is going to transform the Middle East for freedom.

As do I. Of course, I don't think the NeoCons were really all that concerned with Middle East democracy, because if they were, I think they'd have developed some sort of a plan for the aftermath before they actually went to war. Mostly, I think they very firmly believed they had to topple Iraq, and convinced themselves that everything would work out for the best solely because they believed they were right. Chosen by god, if you will. The talk of "Middle East Democracy" is just more empty rhetoric to prop up what was always just gut-feel policy.